Yes to Europe

The ballot paper for the 1975 EEC referendum.

Our collective memory of the 2016 referendum is emerging: voters were not told by either side the pros and cons of membership of the EU. Our collective memory of the 1975 referendum is that voters were deceived into voting for a Common Market and were kept in the dark about ever-closer economic and political union.

It is too early to foresee the impact of the 2016 referendum on either the UK or indeed Europe but historian Robert Saunders has written a fascinating analysis of the 1975 vote: Yes to Europe, the 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain. If we can understand why the UK decided to join Europe in 1975, by 67.2% to 32.8%, then it might better inform us why the electorate changed its mind.

A good starting point is to discover that when Britain joined in 1973 politicians in all parties were up for it and the voters sceptical – similar to 2016. Anthony King in a study of the referendum writes “between early 1973 and late February 1975, the balance of public opinion was never in favour of Britain’s EEC membership; from early March 1975 onwards, it was never against it”. We will see how they were persuaded in a moment but why were politicians and businessmen always keen to join?

Sharing the platform, at the first Presss conference of the ‘Keep Britain in Europe’ movement in London. From Left: Jeremy Thorpe, leader of the Liberal Party; Edward Heath, former Premier and former leader of the Conservative Party and Roy Jenkins, Labour, Home Secretary, warned of the consequences if Britons decide to leave the Common Market at the forthcoming referendum.

After the war Britain’s trading partners were Commonwealth countries and not the six original Common Market members. Robert Saunders writes: “In 1951, Australia alone – with a population barely larger than Greater London – took 12% of British exports, more than the economies of the Six combined. From 1952 to 1954, the Commonwealth accounted for nearly half of British imports (47%) and exports (48%). The equivalent figures for the Six were 12.6% and 19.6% respectively … in 1954 the Commonwealth took 95% of British car exports … just as importantly, the Commonwealth supplied the things that Britain most needed for post-war reconstruction: food, raw materials and commodities.”

This was to change as Britain relinquished its empire and its economic growth fell far behind that of the Six, especially West Germany. Britain played a key role in NATO and the European Atomic Energy Community but because of debt from the war and economic stagnation was going broke. By the 1960s joining Europe seemed to be an economic necessity although the opposition of de Gaulle and, to a lesser extent Pompidou, delayed acceptance into the EEC. The problem by then was that entry had to be on the terms already agreed by the Six which were disadvantageous to the UK.

Two specific stumbling blocks were the Common Agricultural Policy and the UK’s contribution to the EEC budget. The Wilson government sought a renegotiation, just as the Cameron government attempted. Wilson’s perceived success was a factor in changing public opinion. Another equally important element was the despair felt in Britain in the 1970s. Sterling was on the rocks, as was the Stock Market (down 73% at one point). Strikes were endemic and inflation rampant (close to 25% at its worst). Having won the war Britain was losing the peace. However, the deciding factor was a brilliantly conceived and executed marketing campaign that we will return to tomorrow.

https://youtu.be/BoeAqeKW5Wk